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LEISURE, SELF-RELIANCE, 
AND THE FAMILY 
1. DEDICA TION AND PROJECTION 
Juha-Pekka Rentto 
Javier Hervada is one of the scholars who first opened my eyes 
to the secrets of the philosophy of law. Afterwards 1 have step by 
step worked my way back to the original sources: from John 
Finnis and Alasdair Macintyre to Aquinas, from Aquinas to 
Aristotle, from Aristotle to Plato. Without Professor Hervada and 
a few other colleagues 1 might never have found that way back to 
the roots of Europe and had instead remained engulfed in the 
vagaries of vain modernity. This piece, be it called an essay, or 
more likely un esbozo, pays homage to his work which has served 
as a source of inspiration to many a young lawyer, canonist and 
philosopher. 
1 intend to go back to the roots of Europe once more, viz., to 
the fundamental European conception of the state as an institution 
for freedom: the state, for us, is not merely an economic arran-
gement or a method of organized exploitation, but a moral enter-
prise for the purpose of making men good citizens and thereby 
setting them free. 1 shall examine Aristotle's philosophy of the 
state in order to pro vide the basic background for later attempts at 
elucidating the criteria for good government. The catholic social 
doctrine is largely based on Aristotelian ideas, with the principIe 
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of subsidiarity as an obvious application. Nevertheless, if we 
compare sorne aspects of the principIe to Aristotle's explicit 
thoughts about civil freedom, a potential conflict emerges: it 
seems difficult to maintain with Aristotle that a leisurely life is a 
necessary prerequisite for civil freedom and at the same time 
claim, as the principIe of subsidiarity would seem to suggest, that 
economic self-reliance is necessary for freedom. 1 will argue that 
the conflict is in principIe merely apparent and depends on a 
misled libertarianish interpretation of subsidiarity. 
Aristotle also holds that civil freedom will in fact require a 
division of society to a leisurely class and a working class, so that 
the former can be free while the latter pro vide them with a living. 
The social welfare state has set out to overcome this division in 
order to set everyone free so that all could be citizens on an equal 
standing. So far it has failed. This raises the question whether the 
task is feasible at all. Practical reasons seem to indicate the 
unlikelihood of it ever being possible to provide everyone with 
such a leisurely life as Aristotle requires for full civil freedom. 
The catholic doctrine of the primacy of family to the state, an 
application of the principIe of subsidiarity, is a potential solution 
to the problem: where it may not bring about absolute civil 
freedom, it may ensure that the second-best thing be achieved: 
even if all do not actually get to govern themselves and each 
other politically, they will at least gain a freedom from being 
manipulated by the state because they have alife and a perso-
nality which is independent from it. The social welfare state 
ideology must therefore be criticised for its agenda -hidden or 
explicit- for liberating the citizens from their families in order to 
incorporate them as dependent clients to the brave new household 
comprising the entire state l. Thereby we can lose the state as a 
l. For a discussion of this idea, vide Juan CRUZ CRUZ, "Familia, trabajo y 
política en Aristóteles", Persona y Derecho 20 (1989*), pp. 9-60, which refers 
further to H. ARENDT The Human Condition, Basic Books, New York 1958. 
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moral institution for freedom, and be left with an economic 
arrengement for greater efficiency of production. 
n. THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY AND A POSSIBLE CRITICISM 
OF THE WELFARE STA TE 
Since it was first explicitly formulated in Quadragesimo anno, 
the principIe of subsidiarity has been a comestone of the catholic 
social doctrine. According to it, the state is a subsidiary insti-
tution which exists for the citizens (and not the citizens for the 
state): the raison d'etre of the state is to help the citizens to 
achieve their goals, to carry out their tasks, and to assume full 
responsability for their lives2. The state ought on the one hand to 
extend the citizens whatever support they need in order to assume 
that responsability, but on the other hand it ought to refrain from 
assuming responsibilities from the citizens by doing for them 
things and making for them choice s which would properly be 
theirs to do and make. 
The key word is responsibility: subsidiarity assigns to the 
citizens primary responsibility for their own ends both individual 
and common, and recognizes the responsibility of the state for the 
citizens' lives as subsidiary, or secondary. Thus it is possible 
to analyze the principIe into two subprinciples: a principie of 
subsidy would requiere the state to pro vide for the necessary help 
to the citizens when they cannot carry out their lives on their 
own; and a principie of second resort would require the state to 
refrain from interfering with the citizens' lives in a way which 
would unduly prevent them from assuming responsibility and/or 
reduce their capacity for self-reliance and self-control. AH 
govemment interference, including public aid under the principIe 
2. For a philosophical analysis of the principIe, vide Hugo T AGLE, "El 
principio de subsidiariedad", Persona y Derecho 3 (1976), pp. 129-150. 
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of subsidy, ought to be directed at making the citizens more 
independent and more capable of exercising control over their 
destinies. Functioning in this way the state will be a genuine 
institution for the personal freedom of the citizens -and not just a 
utilitarian arrangement for an effective exploitation of human 
material for maximum welfare. 
For an enlightened reader the Aristotelian roots of the prin-
cipIe of subsidiarity ought to be obvious. Let me therefore only 
sketch a general outline of the argument which provides the 
essential link between Aristotle and Quadragesimo anno. It 
begins with ontology: according to Aristotle everything that 
exists has its own end towards which it tends. Existence, as it 
were, consists in a movement which brings the thing eloser and 
eloser to the fulfilment which belongs to it according to its 
specific nature. The end of a thing is perfection, and the nature of 
each thing is defined by the kind of perfection it seeks and by the 
material conditions under which that search is to take place. Now 
the human nature is according to Aristotle that of a speaking 
animaP. This ineludes two aspects: with inward speech, man is 
rational; with outward speech, man is social by nature. Rence his 
task in life is to actualize his rational and social potential to the 
utmost so as to reach the perfection that is natural to his species. 
A fully human béing is fully rational and fully social, and to 
become such is the end of each and every human individual4. 
To be fully rational is to act according to reason. A rational 
person is thereby a well-functioning human being. To function 
3. Vide 1 Po lit. 2 (1253a 8-18). 
4. Note that Aristotle is keen on the idea that perfection must in principIe 
be accessible to everyone, for were it not so, it would make little sense to 
maintain that it is human nature to seek perfection: should all too many men 
fail to attain perfection, it would show that the human nature is inadequate to 
itself and thereby inappropriately designed- and this would be contrary to the 
very concept of nature which always provides its representatives with all the 
necessary means to their perfection and never inc1udes anything which is 
superfluous to that end. Vide 1 Eth. Nic. 9 (1099b 17-25). 
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well is to perform one's funcion in an excellent way. Thus a good 
person is one who excels in his task. He is also virtuous in that he 
has a constant and perpetual tendency to act excellently. The 
natural end of man is, then, to become aman of virtue. Such a 
person shall be fully capable of goveming his actions, desires and 
aversions with reason, which is the most excellent part of mano 
He shall have rational possession of his will, appetite, sen ses and 
body, being both willing and capable to restrain all and any 
inordinate impulses which may come over him from the sensible 
world and to subordinate them to the right mean of virtue. Ra-
tional self-reliance and moral self-possession -essential aspects 
of subsidiarity- constitute the Aristotelian ideal of personal 
autonomy. 
To be fully rational in a fully social manner requires full 
membership in a perfect human community. The household, 
according to Aristotle, is the most natural human community in 
the order of genesis: it is the primary community over which all 
other communities are edified, but it is not perfect. It is not 
even natural in the most important sense of "natural": the most 
natural community in the last analysis is the one which reflects 
the human nature most perfectly5. Therefore it must be the 
community which is the last one in the order of genesis, ven if it 
is the first one in the order of ends. It is the political community, 
which is perfect not only demographically, geographically, 
historically, and economically6, but also morally: it covers in 
every way all the aspects of the good of all its members from 
every viewpoint7. It brings together under its providence all the 
individual ends of the members and makes them common by 
incorporating them into its own end, viz. the common good of all. 
5. Vide l Polit. 2 (1252b 27 - 1253a 40). 
6. I.e., inclusive of alI the inhabitants both past, present and future in the 
entire territory in question, and capable of providing for its own continued and 
independent existence. 
7. Vide VIII Eth. Nic. 9 (1160a 9-30); etiam l Polit. 1 (1252a 1-6). 
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In it, individual pursuits are transformed into a common pursuit 
for the happiness of everyone. This takes place when the mem-
bers acquire rational virtue and exercise it, too, not only for self-
control but also for mutual government over each other. The 
perfect man governs not only himself but also his peers with his 
reason, and the perfect community it the one which makes this 
possible for its members. It is the state, and citizens are its 
members. 
Aristotle's state is educational8. So is the spirit of subsidiarity: 
according to both, the state is to make the citizens more capable 
of exercising control over their lives. But a crucial point is that 
it is not possible for the state to make the citizens virtuous by 
acting for them: Virtue is a matter of personal habit and character. 
Aristotle calls it one's second nature, to be acquired by habi-
tuation, in order to distinguish it from one's first nature, which is 
the specific human nature common to all as members of the 
human species. Aristotle holds that the role of the school is 
crucial: it gives the pupils the habit of rational discipline, which is 
a sine qua non for any further learning. Yet it is not the school or 
the teacher who grows habits in the soul of the pupil or puts them 
there: it is the pupil who acquires them there: it is the pupil who 
acquires them by practicing9. Each person is potentially virtuous 
according to his specific nature, but he can only become actually 
virtuous by exercising virtue with a constant effort to bring his 
actions under the rule of reason. Thus virtue is not only the goal 
of human life but also the method by which that goal can be 
reached. As such, it is a practice which consists in making mo-
rally relevant choices under the disciplined guidance of reason. 
No one can make morally relevant choices for anyone but 
himself. Therefore virtue can only be acquired by oneself. In the 
same way no one can make another person vicious, either. Not 
8. Vide 1 Eth. Nic. 13 (11 02a 5-25). 
9. Vide II Ethic. Nic. 13 (1103a 14 - l103b 25). 
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even the state can in any way directly add to the virtue of the 
citizens. All it can do is provide these with an education which 
helps them to orient themselves towards virtue and away from 
vice, and create a social environment which facilitates their 
exercise of virtue and makes it possible for them to make their 
own morally relevant choices. For this reason it must be so 
organized that citizens can in fact control their lives: there is no 
way of acquiring self-control but practicing it, even under the risk 
of an occasional failure. This is c1early the source of the principIe 
of second resort: the state should secure the citizens a consi-
derable sphere of freedom from government interference in order 
to let them practice: if they are not allowed to achieve personal 
sucesses as well as to suffer personal backlashes on their own 
initiative and on their own reasonabIe risk, they do not even have 
a chance of genuinely actualizing their natural human potential. 
Responsibility for one's own growth towards a full actuality 
of human nature rests on one's own shoulders. Virtue is self-
acquired, and the natural human happiness which comes about 
in a well-functioning state which consists of well-functioning 
citizens is self-made lO. The state cannot acquire civil virtue and 
distribute it to the citizens: it is for the citizens to achieve. The 
citizens are the true political community, and the visible con-
ventional state is just a tool which can help the citizens on their 
way towards that community. The citizens do not exist for the 
visible state, it exists for them. On the other hand, the citizens 
be long to the ideal state as to their most natural community. This 
is the essential Aristotelian background which lends the principIe 
of subsidiarity the moral sen se that makes it politically appealing. 
As a result of the recent economic recession which led all 
governments to seek ways of saving funds, the social welfare 
states have also begun to respond to the appeal of subsidiarity: 
10. Vide III Polit. 9 (l280a 31-34) where it is indicated that a good life is 
self-chosen, and III Eth. Nic. 5 (l114a 32 - IlISa 2) where the responsibility 
of a person for what he becomes is discussed. 
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the principIe appears obviously susceptible of being used as a 
means for justifying a démise or at least a downgrading of the 
rather expensive welfare state. 
A leading idea of the social welfare state is that it is the task of 
the government to secure a reasonable material welfare for 
everyone. The government collects taxes from those who can pay 
and reallocates the funds according to need 11. A portion is used 
for the purpose of maintaining public education, health care and 
similar things, another for the purpose of maintaining a public 
pension system, yet another for the purpose of helping different 
groups of needy people in special situations, like students, single 
paren~s, the unemployed, the handicapped, etc. It can be argued 
that if the general coverage of welfare arrangements gets to be too 
inclusive and if government support in the form of welfare aid 
ar~angements becomes too widely and easily accessible, it will 
eventually delapidate the citizens' moral backbone: the en ter-
prising spirit will wane, laziness will win terrain, fewer will want 
to make an effort to make their own living when they can manage 
even on welfare. In the long run, people will acquire the habit of 
asking the government for help when they meet any loss, obstacle 
or adversity which would require a disciplined effort were they to 
try to overcome it on their own. A habit of reliance on public 
welfare will grow, fostering widespread dependence on the 
government. In the end, no one will even be capable of earning 
his own living any more. Excessive social welfare will have led 
to a general state of civil unfreedom. For this reason the welfare 
system ought to be revised so as to encourage private enterprise 
and individual initiative. 
The argument may appear sound. Intuitively compelling exam-
pIes could easily be brought to its support, but it would be equally 
easy to counter it by pointing out that empirical evidence is at the 
11. Of course the idea is anything but new: e.g. Aristotle recounts that two 
daily oboles were distributed in his days to the "useless" Athenians for their 
upkeeping; vide Resp. atheniens (49,4). 
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very least inconclusive l2. In any case we are primarily interested 
in whether the idea itself stands clO'Ser scrutiny. We shall first 
discuss the problem in the light of a likely counterargument to be 
presented by the supporters of the social welfare state. As both 
arguments revolve intimately around the concept of freed0ll?-, we 
must initiate our discussion with an excursion to Aristotle's 
notions about civil freedom. Then we shall look at the welfare 
state as an ambitious arrangement plausibly intended for the very 
purpose of maximizing the scope of civil freedom rather than 
diminishing it. 
111. LEISURE AND ECONOMIC SELF-SUPPORT 
For Aristotle the state is the institution which makes possible 
human perfection 13. In it, the human nature comes to full bloom 
when the citizens learn to exercise a comprehensive and mutual 
self-governance. But for Aristotle it is a fact that this was not 
something for every inhabitant of the state: even if in principIe it 
ought to be possible for each member of the human species to 
acquire the perfection which belongs to its nature, in actual 
practice it is impossible. This is due to a set of overlapping 
reasons. Sorne of them have to do with the moral requirements 
Aristotle gives for citizenship, whereas others relate to the 
practical requirements for the same. The common denominator 
for all of these is the concept of independence. 
12. Recent empirical studies in Finland suggest that one's choice between 
being unemployed and employed tends to be determined by factors relatively 
unrelated with the welfare system. 
13. l.e., the perfection relative to the practical necessities of life which 
consists in perfect virtue. We shall for the present purposes leave aside the 
absolute human perfection which for Aristotle consists in theoretical contem-
plation.- Vide l/l Polit. 1-2, where Aristotle points out that in a state people 
can live the life which is as happy as can be, given their real circumstances. 
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The moral and practical requirements for citizenship reer to 
the notion that citizenship is twofold much in the same way as 
virtue. Citizenship in its full ideal sense is like perfect virtue: a 
citizen simpliciter is fully capable of rational governance over 
himself and over his peers. He can both govern and be go-
verned14. Such a citizenship is the end of the state. Yet while the 
state is still on its way to this ultimate perfection it consists of 
citizens secundum quid, practicing mutual self-government in a 
way relative to the stage of development in which they and the 
state find themselves. These imperfect citizens are inhabitants of 
the state practicing in order to reach citizenship simpliciter, or 
citizens in spe in their process of learning civil skills. If they are 
to become citizens in the full sense they must practice the civil 
skills even if they are not yet in their full cornmandl5. Citizenship 
secundum quid is in this way like a method for acquiring 
citizenship simpliciter_ . 
The key requirement for citizenship is freedom, equivalent to 
autonomy, independence and self-reliance: only a free person 
capable of self-control can be a citizen, and a dependent reliance 
on others is incompatible with freedom. Only free persons can be 
equal, too, as equality requires mutual independence. Dependence 
makes thus equality impossible. But only equals can have a 
mutual relationship "with no strings attached", i.e. a relationship 
which is not private but publico Private relationshjps are governed 
by particular considerations related to the individuals in question, 
whereas public relationships are between individuals in their 
abstract capacity of citizen. Therefore they are universal and 
susceptible of being governed by generally applicable laws. An 
analogy to the modern concept of sovereignty is dose: in their 
mutual relationships, citizens are like sovereign kings over their 
14. Vide III Po lit. 4. 
15. Vide III Polit. 9 (1281a 1-8), where "more" and "Iess" citizens are 
explicitly distinguished. 
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own spheres of life and in that sen se on a free and egua! standing 
vis-a-vis each other. 
Now sorne people are excluded from citizenship because they 
are morally incapable of the rational self-governance in which 
freedom consists. Most notable among these are slavelike and 
mentally adolescent people, children, and women. The slavelike 
are slaves of their passions and therefore incapable of rational 
self-control I6.The mentally adolescent17 are short-sighted, easily 
excited, easily bored, pleausure-seeking braggards who have 
never grown up past adolescence and are therefore unreliable and 
unsuited for citizenship. Children are potential future citizens l8 , 
given that they receive a suitable education, but as long as they 
are not adult they are incapable of rational self-control and 
dependent on adult guidance. One of the most important tasks of 
the state is to provide for their education. Women are in principIe 
egually rational with men, but Aristotle thinks that they have a 
different constitution which somehow deprives the reason of its 
supreme position of command: even if women know what is the 
right thing to do they do not necessarily do it because in them the 
reason lacks sufficient authority over the will l9. Hence they are 
morally dependent on their husbands or fathers20. 
16. Vide III Eth. Nic. 11 (11l8b 15-28); 1 Po lit. 5-6; etiam 1 Po lit. 13 
(1260a 11). 
17. For the definition, vide 1 Eth. Nic. 32 (1095a 2-10). 
18. Vide 1 Polit. 13 (1260a 12-13) . 
. 19. Vide ibidem (l260a 11-12); Perhaps Aristotle is thinking ofthe mental 
instability which comes with the menstrual period, or of the general experience 
that women tend to be less "men of principIe", i.e. morally and politically more 
flexible and pragmatic than meno 
20. It is impossible he re to engage in a further discussion on Aristotle's 
view of women. The difference between the sexes seems to turn on whether 
the female akrasia is qualitatively different from the weakness of the will 
which can affect men, too. The latter is in principIe avoidable and remediable 
by education. In his account of the relationship between husband and wife, 
Aristotle comes as clase as a hair's breadth away from conceding that within 
the household it might be possible to educate women, too, to rational self-
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Women and children are excluded from citizenship also 
because they are economically dependent on the head of the 
household_ The same goes for slaves, hired servants and clients_ 
But even anyone who works for a salary or performs manual 
labour21 , quite regardless of whether he is dependent on a given 
household, should ideally be excluded, partly because such 
people are economically dependent on others willing to pay them 
for their work, but even more so because they are dependent on 
their own labour: having to earn their living with their work, 
they do not have the spare time or the leisure22 necessary for 
practicing civil skills in order to be able to take active part in 
politics_ Therefore they cannot be citizens in the full sense, either. 
Aristotle's polis is thus divided into citizens whoare free and 
equal, and to noncitizens who are unfree and incapable of being 
equaL It is also clear that the citizens' freedom and mutual 
independence is to a large extent made possible by the working 
effort of those who are not citizens: when the dependent members 
of the household -wife, servants, slaves, clients, hired hands-
provide the head of the household with whatever he may need to 
satisfy his daily necessities so that he need not worry overly 
much about his material welfare- he is set free to leave the 
privacy of the household for the public place in order to talk 
politics with his peers_ In this way, leisure turns out to be the 
essential source of freedom and thus an absolute prerequisite for 
citizenship, too. For these reasons it is also very clear that in 
order for the state even to exist and function in a meaningful way 
it must be composed of mutually independent households, the 
heads of which form the corps of citizens. Without self-
supporting households there can be no independent citizens, and 
control by assigning them tasks which prepare them for a position of res-
ponsibility. Vide / Polit. 12; cf / CEcon. 4 and lllEcon. /-3. 
21. Vide / Polit. /3 (l260b 1-2); lll, 5 (1278a 8-25). 
22. Vide II Polit. // (l273a 21-35). 
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without independent citizens there can be no civil government23 . 
AH this presupposes that a large part of the population be in fact 
exc1uded from citizenship24: in order for anyone to be a citizen, 
others must provide him with the leisure necessary for parti-
cipating in politics by freeing him from earning his living with 
his own work. 
Aristotle's poli tic al ideal is in an apparent conflict with the 
idea purportedly derivable from the principIe of subsidiarity that 
everyone has primary responsibility for earning his own living: if 
so, one can hardly have a leisurely life. Nevertheless, I will argue 
that subsidiarity will not require that everyone earn his own living 
working with his own hands. The idea that the principIe can 
yield such a requirement is based on an overstatement of the 
importance of econornic independence. Subsidiarity is primarily a 
moral notion, and only secondarily an economic one. Therefore 
the c1aim that everyone should earn his living with his own hands 
cannot be treated as a matter of economics alone. Economic 
independence is an important part of the self-control sought by 
the principIe of subsidiarity25, but in the Iast analysis it is 
important only inasmuch as it has moral relevance as a potentiaI 
means or obstac1e to moral independence. Economic self-support 
can be required by the principIe of subsidiarity only insofar as it 
facilitates not only the economic but also the moral self-control of 
the person in question. To which degree someone ought to be 
personally responsible for his own living will thereby vary 
according to the relevant conditions. 
It is crucial that the principIe of subsidiarity has a pedagogical 
function: to teach people to assume self-control. In this way it 
23, For an enlightening discussion of these aspects, vide Juan CR UZ 
CRUZ, ap. supra cit. 
24. For a near explicit statement of this, vide VIII Palito 2 (l337b 5-20). 
25. From an economic point of view private enterprise and private 
ownership will create a greater net welfare, as Aristotle knew well, too; vide II 
Palito 5 (l262b 38 - 1263 b 29). 
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differs radically from libertarianism, which sees the relationship 
between individual working effort and material welfare as a 
matter of reciprocal justice. From the point of view of subsi-
diarity, demands placed on a person concerning his self-support 
ought ultimately to be tailored according to his moral need and 
capacity, rather than material need: whether he needs the kind of 
education which a timely and generous public welfare aid can 
facilitate, or whether he needs the kind of education which being 
left on his own at the right moment can give him, or anything 
between the two extremes. It is equally possible to gain morally 
from material welfare as it is from the lack of it, and it is equally 
possible to suffer moral damage due to a deficit in one's material 
welfare as it is due to excessive material welfare26 . On these 
grounds the principIe of subsidiarity will not rightly yield any 
sweeping statement to the effect that he who works not, shall not 
eat bread. On the contrary, an optimal allocation of work and 
leisure should be based on how they benefit the moral character 
of everyone concerned, and welfare aid is justified in order to 
-but only in order to- help a person to (re)gain control over his 
life. 
IV. THE WELFARE STATE AS AN INTENDED IMPROVEMENT ON 
ARISTOTLE 
One might phrase the fundamental idea of the principIe of 
subsidiarity with regard to welfare as follows: Welfare is good, 
but it is not necessarily for the moral good of a persono Moral 
good can only accrue from a responsible exercise of personal 
command over one's own life. Therefore the state should not 
frustrate anyone's chances at a genuine self-authorshipby unduly 
26. Self-control can master a material shortage as well as abundan ce. The 
quality of one's life depends on one's ability to live well, given the amount of 
welfare one has. 
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changing his material condition: everyone ought to be allowed to 
have a go at his own difficulties and adversities on his own, and 
the state should extend a helping hand only secondarily and with 
careful discretion. When help is offered by the government it 
ought absolutely to be intended and designed to render the person 
in question more independent from public interference. The 
welfare state would seem to share the main goal with the subsi-
diary state inasmuch as it can be regarded as an institution which 
seeks to increase the freedom of the citizens. If we place it against 
the Aristotelian background of European political thought, it 
c1early appears as an attempt at setting free all alike in a political 
cornmunity without a division between free citizens and unfree 
producers27 . A major difference between the two emerges in 
method: the subsidiary state seeks to foster freedom by 
encouraging people to self-help, but the welfare state promotes 
freedom by actively interfering in order to satisfy everyone's 
reasonable material needs so as to free them from the predi-
cament of worrying about survival. In this way the welfare state 
thinks it can unleash the capacity of citizens for a better life. 
The welfare state can be criticized from a moral viewpoint by 
pointing out that while it c1early increases freedom and welfare in 
the liberal utilitarian sen se that more people can in fact do more 
of the things they want to do and get more of the goods they 
want to have, it may dilapidate the moral freedom of citizens by 
making them more dependent on the public support mechanism, 
on unnecessary excesses of material welfare, on external in-
fluences dictated by commercial markets of commodities, plea-
sure, and desire satisfaction - in short, less in rational command of 
their lives and more like slaves under their passions28 . This is a 
large matter which cannot be addressed here in its totality. At the 
27. Interestingly enough, Aristotle mentions the possibility in question in 
IV Polit. 7 (\293a 1-9). 
28. For a statement of the right and false kinds of freedom at stake, vide V 
Polit. 9 (13lOa 25-36). 
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end of this essay we shall approach the problem by way of 
examining the fate of the family in the welfare state. In the 
meanwhile we shall look at sorne practical problems the welfare 
project will unavoidably meet on its way to the 10ft Y ideal of 
liberating all. 
The objective of the welfare state would be, upon our 
interpretation, to redistribute wealth among the citizens so as to 
make everyone so well-off materially that all have an equal 
opportunity to freedom. Aristotle's exclusion of productive wor-
kers from full citizenship gives us reason to ask whether this task 
is fe asible at all: is it possible, given the real world and its limited 
resources, to set everyone free in a genuine republic of all where 
each and every member of society is a full citizen with access to 
mutual self-control over common matters? The answer would 
more likely seem to be no than yes: at least so far the welfare 
states have not succeeded in creating a universal self-governing 
body of citizens_ We also have reason to doubt that they ever will, 
due to the economic constraints under which such an enterprise 
must succumb: A welfare state will necessarily require a large 
public economy in order to provide the desired high level of 
social welfare and security. A large public economy will require 
large tax revenues. Large tax revenues will requiere a large and 
successful national economy. That again will require constant 
economic growth with maximum productivity and a high rate of 
employment. In one word, the welfare state will require a huge 
productive and economic input from the citizens: practically 
everyone will have to spend most of his waking time to either the 
production of goods or to their consumption in a way which 
is most beneficial for the economy29. As a result, little time 
29. The welfare state seems also to destroy the old aristocracies the 
members of which used to be able to devote themselves in their free time to 
politics as a matter of vocation: the high tax burden forces everyone to work 
for his living, and in every case an idle life would give abad impression on the 
public. At the same time, the free time at the disposal of the "ordinary" citizen 
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for active leisure remains: after spending twelve hours a day 
working, travelling to and from work, buying groceries and doing 
the necessary chores at home, there is not much time left over for 
self-government, let alone for an active participation in politics. 
The welfare state has failed, and seems to have a tendency to fail, 
to provide its citizens with the leisure they would need in order to 
be truly free authors of truly noble lives and to assume a genuine 
political responsibility for the common good. 
The utilitarian undertones of the welfare society affect the 
relationship between work and leisure in other ways, too. One 
factor is a mutual instrumentalization of free time and work: On 
the one hand, free time trends to be conceived of as an instrument 
for work in that it exists mainly for the purpose of restoring and 
increasing one's productivity. Hence it is also so proportioned that 
it is enough for purposes of recuperation but not enough for 
anyone to grow independent of the daily schedule required by the 
market economy. On the other hand, work tends to be conceived 
of as an instrument for one's free time: one works in order to 
have a few days off every now and then to spend on enjoyable 
diversions and recreational activities with a high desire satis-
faction. Free time is also seen as a reward for performed work. 
does not seem to increase enough to give him even a semblance of leisurely 
life. The distinction between the leisurely and the working class is thus 
destroyed by reducing aH to the working class, thereby making it practicaHy 
impossible for anyone to engage in politics in the manner of the Aristotelian 
ideal. Equality may increase, but not freedom. In the place of a government of 
free self-governing aristocrats there is a government of professional politi-
cians, They can hardly be free inasmuch as their future lives depend on the 
continued favour of the voting masses. The situation resembles to a surprising 
degree Plato's characterization of the most degenerate form of government, 
viz, democracy, as he presents it in The Republic (555B-562A): a wealthy 
minority seek to safeguard their privileges by giving concessions and more 
freedom to the masses, which again try to make the best of the situation by 
extorting from the wealthy as many benefits as they possiblely can, Politics is 
no longer a forum of reasoned deliberation but a market place of commodities 
where desire satisfactions are the medium of exchange. 
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Along comes the idea that it must be spent in a way which is at 
the sharpest possible contrast with work: undisciplined enjoyment 
and fun just for its own sake is what one must fill one's free time 
with if one is to use it "well"30. One rests in order to work 
usefully, and one works in order to be able to waste one's free 
time in the most enjoyable manner. The word "vacation" is 
revealing: free time is "empty time", i.e. time vacated frorn work, 
which one is supposed to spend on "nothing" as in "nothing of 
consequence". Perhaps the modern welfare policy is to-day's 
equivalent to the Roman policy of bread and circuses? In every 
case it is patently clear that where for Aristotle the ultirnate 
objective of work, performed mainly within the household, was 
to set the head of the household free to leave the privacy of the 
horne for the public place in order to talk politics with his peers, 
for the member of a modem welfare society the objective of work 
is to set him free to leave the public workplace for a while in 
order to enjoy the privacy of his horne or whatever diversion rnay 
appeal to his taste. Such an attitude can hardly encourage political 
participation - even if one had time for it. 
It is sometimes claimed that the future "information society" 
will sol ve the shortage of leisure as it cuts down the input of time 
and physical manpower into production. Jobs requiring manual 
labour become obsolete, others can be performed in a shorter 
time with fewer workers, and new jobs depend less on the 
availability of manpower. As a result, the present level of welfare 
can in the future be maintained with a smaller total amount of 
work than to-day. The labour markets after the recession of the 
late '80s and the early '90s may show sorne evidence of 
something like this already happening: productivity has climbed 
aboye the pre-recession level again without a matching increase 
in the rate of employment. In Finland (with approximately 5 
30. Aristotle states in VII Polit. 15 (1334a 15-16) that the end of work is 
free time, just as the end of war is peace, but he has a completely different 
conception of how the free time should be used in a noble manner. 
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million inhabitants) we have roughly the same standard of living 
now as we had in the late 1980's, but we need about 300.000 
workers less in order to maintain it. Curiously enough, very few 
seem to be happy about it: the main worry seems to be the high 
rate of unemployment. The assumption must be that if one is 
unemployed and improductive for the economy one is somehow 
less a citizen: life as unemployed is inferior because it is not 
useful. No one seems to notice the other side of the coin: that 
unemployment could open a possibility for gaining independence 
from time-consuming labour, facilitate self-development and self-
possession, and even give the citizens in question a genuine 
chance to de vote their free time to the noblest of the noble 
pastimes according to Aristotle, viz. to participation in politics31 . 
Why not redistribute the smaller amount of work that is 
necessary for maintaining welfare so that all would have signi-
ficantly more free time at their disposal? A radical change in 
attitudes is necessary if anything like that is to take place32: the 
utilitarian ideal of usefulness as the measure for a person's social 
worth must be discarded, the goal of full employment revised, the 
general preference for full-time work given up, and -aboye all-
the sacrosanct principIe of modern "politics", viz. that it is 
necessary to foster constant economic growth at any cost in order 
to secure international competitiveness, must be left behind. As 
long as we just want more and more affluence there is no hope of 
redistributing work in a way which would give due appreciation 
to the value of leisure for a meaningful life and a fuller 
31. Cf. Polit. loe. cit. supra in footnote 25. 
32. Proposals of the kind have been made in Finland, too, but the 
employers do not want reduced working hours because they are afraid it would 
increase their cots and/or diminish productivity, and the employees do not 
want reduced working hours because they are afraid their income will 
diminish. The unemployed would we1come reduced working hours in the hope 
that it would give them a chance to gain employment. AH parties are mainly 
con cerned for their own economic gain and little else. 
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actualization of the human potentiaP3. But how can we stop 
wanting more and more? 
Aristotle's answer is school, or education. The very word 
"school" originates in the Greek skhole, the primary meaning of 
which is "leisure", "spare time", "ease", "rest" or "idleness". A 
derivative meaning for skhole is "a work of leisure", with special 
reference to such leisurely activities as scholarly discussions and 
learned disputations. Finally, the word carne to be used to denote 
the place where the leisurely activities of scholarship often took 
place, i.e. the school. One aspect of leisureliness at school is of 
course that learned discussions can only take place during one's 
free time, and only those who have idle time can participate in 
them. But Aristotle, in a certain contrast to Plato whose school 
was intended to make the pupils useful citizens34, adds a deeper 
dimension to the relationship of school and leisure when he 
suggests that leisure is not only a necessary prerequisite for being 
educated but also the very essence and final end of education: 
school exists for the purpose of teaching the young scholars to 
use their free time in a noble manner. For this reason they should 
be taught gymnastics in order to gain strength; reading and 
writing, arithmetics and geometry, not because they might be 
useful in the market place but because they make one more 
capable of acquiring more learning; drawing not for any reason of 
usefulness but in order to make one appreciate the beauty of the 
proportions of the human body; and music in order to teach the 
youngsters the difference between noble and uplifting pastimes 
33. Here is another parallel between Plato's pessimistic ideas about the 
degeneration of the state and to-day's reality: for Plato the root of all evil in 
politicallife is the desire of enrichment, and the state ought to be so organized 
as to prec1ude the accumulation of unnecessary wealth. Vide books n, IV and 
VIII of The Republic (372D-374E, 419A-427D, 543C-569C); and book V of 
The Laws (729A, 740A-745B). 
34. Vide book VII of The Republic where the education of the philo-
sophers and the guardians of the state is outlined, and book VII of The Laws 
where the education of the productive citizens is sketched. 
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and mean and base diversions unbecoming a free citizen35 . 
Indeed the whole point of education for Aristotle is to ingrain 
in the pupils a discipline by which they learn to choose noble 
and meaningful ways of spending their spare time -and the 
noblest and most meaningful of these is taking part in politics-
in preference to the ugly and unfree pleasures which can only 
gratify slavelike and adolescent minds. In short, school is to train 
the future citizens in the most important skill they needed in order 
to become good citizens, viz. to use their free time well. 
The Romans captured school in their ambiguous vitae non 
scholae discimus which has, unfortunately, come down to us in 
its more practical interpretation: school is preparation for reallife, 
far from otiose. Modern school trains useful producers and 
consumers. It conveys pieces of knowledge and teaches skills for 
the purpose of practical utility. If only we could return to the 
roots of Europe at school and begin to teach our young to spend 
their time well and not merely usefully, maybe then it would be 
possible as a matter of a few generations to achieve that change in 
attitudes which is necessary for breaking the present bond s of 
political serfdom under the forces of the market. I wonder if the 
political establishment can bring itself to such a sharp break with 
the gospel of economics, or if an eventual intervention by an 
enlightened tyrant cast in Plato's pessimistic mould is our best 
chance36. 
V. A SECOND-BEST ALTERNATIVE: THE FAMILY PRINCIPLE? 
Europe carries within her fols the twin heritage of Plato's 
35. Vide VIII Polit., especially 2-3 (l337a 33 - 1338b 8). 
36. Vide book IV of The La.ws (709C-712A) where Plato explains how the 
best way of reforrning a state is that a strong enlightened tyrant destroy the old 
structures all at a strike, making a clean sweep of all the remnants of the old 
degeneration and rubbish in order to be able to make a fresh start. 
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pessimistic belief in the blessings of state totalitarianism and 
Aristotle's optimistic faith in the human capacity to flourish in a 
civil state as self-governing free citizens. The two aspects of the 
tradition, so different in their applications, share nevertheless the 
ideal of human perfection and the notion that the point of the state 
is to facilitate that perfection. The aristocratic solution of Aris-
totle was that in order to make freedom possible for a political 
élite of citizens other inhabitants of the state must be excluded 
from citizenship. The monocratic solution of Plato was that aH 
men and women can be citizens but only for the purpose of 
fulfilling the vital functions of the state as its servants: the state 
should be governedby political experts: a single philosopher 
king, or a smaH avant-garde of specially educated guardians. 
Europe has experimented with both solutions: Aristotle's feH 
finaHy to disuse with the rise of the representative democracies of 
this century, Plato's experienced a short revival which began in 
1917 and ended sorne 70 years later in a complete disaster37. The 
social welfare state is also about to faH short of its ideal of 
everyone's equal freedom, an ideal greater than Plato or Aristotle 
ever conceived. But we should understand that not even Plato had 
any illusions about the practicability of his political ideas: many 
a time in his dialogues he states how things ought to be but soon 
makes very clear that it would be impracticable in real life. Aris 
totle, again, had a pronouncedly pragmatic attitude to politics: if 
the perfect alternative was bound to fail, one could always adopt 
a more practicable second-best solution actualizable in the given 
conditions38 . We should foHow their example and look for a 
37. To the good fortune of the Syracusans, Plato's own recorded attempts 
at putting his ideas into practica were aborted already before they began to take 
effect. 
38. That Aristotle was no preacher can be seen in the offhand manner in 
which he gives practical advice to Greek governors concerning how the 
ordinary citizens can best be kept away from meddling with politics, or to 
tyrants concerning how they can best remain in power as long as possible. Vide 
e.g. IV Politics II (1295a 25-30) and V, 11. 
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solution which, while it may fall short of actualizing at once the 
ultimate ideal of everyone'shuman perfection, still facilitates the 
growth of as many as possible to the freedom and independence 
that is within their reach, given the conditions of reallife. 
The principIe of subsidiarity may provide a second-best 
solution like that if we apply it as a trilateral affair between 
individual, farnily and state. The catholic church is perhaps the 
major proponent of such an approach when she constant1y 
underlines the role of the family as the basic human cornmunity. 
It has several essential functions: It gives new human beings life 
and maintains it by providing daily sustenance and shelter. It is 
also the basic educational institution, the primary task of which is 
to teach the children to become responsible persons as they grow 
up39. The key to the nature of this education is the fundamental 
obligation of the farnily to let go of the children, to set them free 
when they are ready. The children are not the parents' property: 
they are different individuals with their own lives and their own 
destinies. Por a while they are incapable of leading their lives and 
seeking their ends on their own, and they must depend on their 
family on help. As they grow up they gain independence step by 
step, and finally they grow entirely free, reaching a position of 
equality with their parents. In short, the family is on this view 
radically an institution for freedom. The freedom one can reach 
growing up in one's farnily consists, for one thing, in being in full 
possession of oneself, in self-control: The child learns that he is 
someone different from everyone else and with an own standing 
and an own fate which it is for himse1f to live out on his own. To 
signify this, the family gives him a name which is his alone and 
identifies him completely. At the same time the child learns that 
he belongs to something of which he is a part: the family, the 
lineage, the tradition, that he shares a background and a set of 
39. About the different aspects of the educational function of the family, 
vide e.g. Oliveros F. OTERO, "La dimensión educativa de la familia", Persona 
y Derecho 10 (1983), pp. 327-352. 
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goals with others, that he has a history and a baggage of values 
and moral standards as a result of that history. Taking his parents' 
example, the child can also learn to give himself as a gift to 
others, learning thereby the basics of friendship and reaching the 
highest independence of all, viz. being able to give oneself away 
without thought for what it will yield in return. In one word, the 
child learns to know who he is, individually and socially, and to 
live accordingly. This aspect of the family can be called its 
person-making function: the family exists in order to make 
persons out of their offspring, not only in a material sen se of 
producing new individuals but in the moral sense of leading them 
to take full charge of their lives freely and intelligently. 
The catholic doctrine accepts basically the Aristotelian ideal of 
the state as a political community of free and equal citizens, but it 
also acknowledges the practical difficulties such an ideal will 
inevitablely meet. As a second-best solution it suggests that 
perhaps it would be a good idea to concentrate on personhood 
rather than citizenship. Instead of engaging in a futile attempt at 
making all fully free and independent citizens in the sen se of 
full participation in mutual self-government, one should secure 
everyone at least the freedom one can enjoy having the 
possession of self which is necessary for one's personal self-
government. Among the minimum requirements of such a self-
possession are that one knows who one is, that one knows one is 
someone even independently of the state, that one knows one is a 
person in charge of one's own fate and no-one's property. An 
essential criterion is that the source of one's self-knowledge, of 
one's personhood, must be independent from the state: only if one 
can derive one's personal status from a source which does not 
owe its own existence and status to the state can one occupy a 
position of equal standing towards the state. Persons who know 
who they are irrespective of the state are strong enough to 
withstand government manipulation and need to be approached 
by the state on polite (sic) negotiationg terms. The resulting 
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principIe can be formulated as follows: the political community 
ought to guarantee the families of which it consists sufficient 
free do m to raise and educate their offspring on their own res-
ponsibility and independently of any state interference which 
would reduce their ability to fully as sume and carry out this task. 
Let us call it the family principie. 
Independent families create a healthy balance of power 
between the state and the citizens. The citizens will know that the 
state exists for them, no the citizens for the state. The state will 
know that the citizens know this, and that there are therefore 
limits to what it can do to them. This consideration turns out to be 
the iocus of one of the most critical problems of the social 
welfare state: it has been the more or less explicit goal of the 
welfare state precisely to liberate the individual citizens, children 
and women in particular40, from "family dependence" in order to 
place all individuals in a direct bilateral relationship to the state 
without the mediation of family or any other institution. It is said 
that such a liberation will increase individual freedom and 
equality of opportunity, which is probably true if we think that 
the essential freedom is liberty to do and to get whatever one may 
wish at will. But from an Aristotelian viewpoint it may diminish 
moral and polítical freedom as it surreptitiously deprives the 
citizens of a genuine possibility to rely on the family as a stable 
and reliable source of material and spiritual sustenance. 
The mechanism of depriving the family of its substance is 
threefold in a welfare state. One way is to make the household 
economy an insufficient source of material sustenance. Her the 
state cooperates with the market economy and lures all family 
members to sell their time on the labour market. High tax levels, 
consumerism, concentration of the work force to cities, and easy 
availability of public day care for young children contribute to 
40. Vice e.g. R. JULKUNEN, "Subsidiariteetti - sosiaaliturvamme suoja vai 
uhka?" Subsidiariteettiperiaate (toim. Arja Jokinen- Vita ja Mari Korhonen), 
Sosiaaliturvan keskusliitto, Helsinki 1994 (36-44), p. 40 p. 
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a society in which work performed within the household has 
only marginal significance for the welfare of the family. The 
household economy will not any more depend on the skill of 
householding but on the flows of external income. At the same 
time the state guarantees a reasonable level of welfare also to 
those who fail to earn a living for one reason or another: the 
pension system, inability payments, unemployment benefits, etc. 
are all so designed as to encourage everyone to adopt a carefree 
attitude: no one is to feel a need to strive for householding self-
sufficiently, for there will always be a friend in the social welfare 
bureau41 . 
Another way is for the state to assume authority over the 
children, which makes the family an insufficient source of 
education. Semi-obligatory contacts between advisory clinics 
and pregnant women and parents with young children make 
inexperienced parents believe that they are incapable of managing 
child care and education by relying on their own intelligence. 
Child-rearing is medicalized and brought under public control 
under the camouflage of help, Parents are encouraged to put their 
children away in public day care even as early as in their first or 
second year, where they will be under the standardized guidance 
of professional child-rearing experts. Observant professional 
pedagogues can find that a family lifestlyle, educational approach 
or living conditions deviate from the norm and initiate a 
procedure of taking the child into public custody for its purported 
protection. Parents have little say about school: both primary and 
secondary education is, in the name of equality, and almost 
exclusive domain of public schools which in principIe all follow 
the same plan of education. At home, parents to not stand a 
chance to counter the street education of their offspring as both 
parents are usually at work away from home when their educative 
41. It is a notorious faet that e.g. the Finnish pension system was first 
introdueed in the 1930's largely in order to invite people to leave subsistent 
farming for industrial emplyoment. 
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input would be needed, or if they are at home they are busy or 
tired or both. As a result it is increasingly difficult for the family 
to transmit to its offspring own values and an own lifestyle strong 
enough to resist the standardizing influences which flood over the 
young from the street, from the market, and from the public 
educational system. 
A third way, which not only deprives the families of the 
necessary prerequisities for performing their person-making 
function independently but also deprives many people of their 
families altogether, is to make families readily dissoluble. The 
citizens are taught that matrimony is a love affair between 
individual contracting parties rather than a community for a 
lifelong enterprise with a common good in view. In the name of 
freedom and equality divorce is facilitated so as to deprive the 
matrimony of a binding character: as a result, instead of holding it 
a mutual obligation which remains in effect even in the absence 
of pleasurability and individual gain, spouses think of it as a 
means to individual pleasure and well-being which can be 
discarded as soon as it ceases to give the desired satifaction. An 
intellectual c1imate which underlines the importance of erotic 
love instead of willed predilection42, and a general public policy 
of divorcing sexual intercourse from its natural and moral 
consequences and reducing it to a mere matter of pleasurable play 
between "coosenting parties"43, contribute to the phasing out of 
matrimony as a comerstone of society. 
As a consequence it becomes difficult for anyone to rely on 
the stability of one's own marriage: spouses can hardly be willing 
to commit themselves wholeheartedly to their common ends if 
42. For an analysis of this distinction, vide e.g. 1. GARCÍA LÓPEZ, "El 
amor humano", Persona y Derecho 1 (1974), pp. 267-280. 
43. Aside from being an excelIent introduction to the essential nature of 
matrimony at large, J. HERV ADA, "Reflexiones en torno al matrimonio a la luz 
del derecho natural", Persona y Derecho 1 (1974), pp. 27-149, includes a lucid 
discussion of this problematic, too. 
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they can never be sure that the other party will also live up to his 
part of the deal. As the spouses enter marriage with an implicit 
reservation which makes their commitment unilaterally retrac-
table at will, they cannot reliablely depend on each other for 
support. The state steps in and offers the spouses its help in order 
to facilitate the economic and other difficulties which may come 
about as a result of divorce. An "enjoy and discard" -mentality of 
the parents gives the children a role model which can hardly 
make it easier for them to regard marriage and family as per-
sistent communities based on mutual commitment and respect. 
More likely they willlearn to use their future spouses, too, as just 
another disposable means to the gratification of their individual 
desires. An easy dissolubility of families also opens way to a 
dirninishing role of parental authority over the children: rearing 
children is a long term project which takes at least 20 years, and 
its outcome depends onthe same persons remaining in charge all 
through that time. Only if that is the case can a family give a 
child a c1ear and genuine identity44. 
We find ourselves at a crossroads with a choice between Plato 
and Aristotle. The welfare state is like a Platonic community with 
weak private families under strict control and with a heavily 
circumscribed authority over their members and resources45 . The 
44. It could be argued even from an Aristotle viewpoint that meeting 
personal difficulties as a child may contribute to one's future excellence as a 
persono On the other hand, failures in life can also be greater as a result of 
difficulties which the child in question is unable to overcome. But this is not 
our concern here: were are interested in whether a child can acquire a stable 
and strong identity to provide him with sufficient resistance against political 
manipulation if the composition of his family does not remain constant over 
his forming years. A child with several sets of family affiliations will plausibly 
be less sure of who he is and where he belongs and thus more open to outside 
influence. 
45. Plato's family ideal was no family : women and children were to be 
commonly shared as he argues in book V of The Republic (457E-469B). In 
The Laws he has given up the idea and develops a family institution in which 
families are organized as liule more than subordinate parts of the state machi-
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family principIe again calls for a subsidiary Aristotelian state 
with relatively independent families with decisive authority over 
themselves and their offspring. The welfare state looks at the 
family as a producer of new human individuals who are alone and 
on their own against the state without a strong family cornmunity 
to rely on in times of adversity. Therefore they can be less 
resistant to stateintereference in their lives and more susceptible 
of public control, external moral infIuence, and economic mani-
pulation. The subsidiary state looks at the family as a procreator 
of new persons who are in possession of themselves and cons-
cious of their human excellence. Therefore they can be able to 
withstand control, infIuence and manipulation, being capable of 
the freedom which consists in being the main, if not sole, authors 
of their destinies. Let this general and tentative conc1usion suffice 
to show that the preoccupation of the catholic church for the 
family in modern society is not just a rigid expression for papist 
bigotry, for outdated reactionary conservatism or for a hopeless 
inability to accept social change. It is a concern for freedom, and 
that in they very sense which makes Europe what she is: a long-
standing project of polítical and moral self-government. 
nery, with a view to raising the right amount of new citizens and giving them 
the right kind of education to satisfy the needs of the state and to make sure at 
the same time that no family acquire too much wealth. Vide books V, VI, VII, 
and XI (734E-738B, 772E-776C, 781A-798E, 922A-932E). 
